Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0879zbMath1013.91043OpenAlexW3121869879MaRDI QIDQ700092

Philip A. Haile, John G. Riley, Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/090663ed64fd1ec96a5185e701a18c9fcca11352

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaEnglish auctionsperfect Bayesian equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids ⋮ Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities. ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature ⋮ Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions

Cites Work

• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction

This page was built for publication: Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions