Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0851zbMath1013.91023OpenAlexW2029739178MaRDI QIDQ700095

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0851

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationlaboratory experimentreputationstreatment variables

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
• Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
• Money does not induce risk neutral behavior, but binary lotteries do even worse
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
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