Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0860zbMath1015.91508OpenAlexW1994673994MaRDI QIDQ700108

Raymond C. Battalio, John M. Wildenthal, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3817ace531263ce834a661b9146ed7ad1649883f

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

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Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction, When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons, An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games

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