Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
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Publication:700118
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0888zbMath1037.91011OpenAlexW2002918695MaRDI QIDQ700118
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0888
Related Items (5)
Memory and perfect recall in extensive games ⋮ Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight ⋮ Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Dynamic consistency in extensive form decision problems
Cites Work
- Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
- A comment on the absent-minded driver paradox
- Dynamic consistency and imperfect recall
- On the expected value of games with absentmindedness
- On ambiguities in the interpretation of game trees
- The absent-minded driver
- Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
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