Stability and segregation in group formation

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0878zbMath1013.91010OpenAlexW2115360031MaRDI QIDQ700120

Eyal Winter, Igal Milchtaich

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ea9950d0b612e479e120fc3321a54d038890decb

zbMATH Keywords

segregationcoalition structurelocal public goodsgroup formationweak acyclicitymyopic optimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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