Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0858zbMath1098.91547OpenAlexW1969451165MaRDI QIDQ700121

Eiichi Miyagawa

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/498716ce771c4bf85832802e2d6037b159e1a052

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (22)

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof ⋮ On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms ⋮ Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. ⋮ The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange ⋮ House exchange and residential segregation in networks ⋮ Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems ⋮ A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties ⋮ Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• House allocation with transfers

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