Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
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Publication:700124
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0892zbMath1015.91510OpenAlexW3121212813MaRDI QIDQ700124
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5e46d7f249da5e099ddedd7676f607a40b0ee71e
Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
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