(Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0890zbMath1018.91007OpenAlexW1992818571MaRDI QIDQ700126

Reza Oladi, Benyamin Shitovitz, Xiao Luo, Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0890

zbMATH Keywords

von Neumann-Morgenstern stable setNTU gamespure exchange economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies ⋮ On stability of economic networks ⋮ Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies. ⋮ Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies ⋮ An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments ⋮ On the foundation of stability

Cites Work

• Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
• Cores of convex games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
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