Rule evolution and equilibrium selection

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0894zbMath1030.91009OpenAlexW2068991435MaRDI QIDQ700128

Wei-Torng Juang

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionmyopic best responsenaive imitationrule evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (8)

Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games ⋮ Unbeatable imitation ⋮ Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game ⋮ Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach ⋮ Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations ⋮ Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response ⋮ Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

This page was built for publication: Rule evolution and equilibrium selection