Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0884zbMath1023.91020OpenAlexW2054287605MaRDI QIDQ700129

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Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0884

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining\(n\)-agent noncooperative gamesdistortion gameinteriority conditionLindahl rulepublic good economyWalrasian rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Are incentives against economic justice? ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism

Cites Work

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• Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
• A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

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