Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0885zbMath1013.91024OpenAlexW2127363218MaRDI QIDQ700130

Darryl A. Seale, Eyal Winter, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/495a746534f5af4c38e7b5e25677758a2a8119d8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcomplete informationlearning modelbinary choicesasymmetric playersnoncooperative iterated market entry games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Simulation analysis using multi-agent systems for social norms ⋮ Batch queues with choice of arrivals: equilibrium analysis and experimental study ⋮ Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence ⋮ Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players ⋮ Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium Play in Large Group Market Entry Games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• The Evolution of Conventions

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