Violations of belief persistence in Dempster-Shafer equilibrium

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0880zbMath1013.91025OpenAlexW2066069433MaRDI QIDQ700132

Matthew J. Ryan

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0880

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesChoquet expected utilityDempster-Shafer ruleDempster-Shafer equilibriumbelief presistence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals ⋮ Non-additive anonymous games

Cites Work

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• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
• Updating ambiguous beliefs
• Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• Robust Statistics

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