Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard
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Publication:704135
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2003.09.015zbMath1067.90080OpenAlexW2066355881MaRDI QIDQ704135
Krishnamurthy Surysekar, Ramachandran Natarajan, Kannan Sethuraman
Publication date: 12 January 2005
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.09.015
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59)
Cites Work
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
- On Manufacturing/Marketing Incentives
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Optimal Facility Location with Concave Costs
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