The veil of public ignorance

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009zbMath1079.91016OpenAlexW2012560681MaRDI QIDQ705834

Klaus Nehring

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationBayesian aggregationInterim Pareto efficiencyUtilitarianismVeil of ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (6)

PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information ⋮ Social preference under twofold uncertainty ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ Uncovering heterogeneous social effects in binary choices ⋮ Fully Bayesian aggregation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Agreeing to disagree
• Iterated expectations and common priors
• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
• How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Common priors under incomplete information: a unification

This page was built for publication: The veil of public ignorance