Investment timing and learning externalities
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Publication:705847
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.006zbMath1079.91018OpenAlexW1992641029MaRDI QIDQ705847
Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Paul Décamps
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.006
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (24)
Competitive Investment with Bayesian Learning: Choice of Business Size and Timing ⋮ Safe marginal time of crude oil price via escape problem of econophysics ⋮ Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ Developing real option game models ⋮ Finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment ⋮ Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation ⋮ Strategic investment and learning with private information ⋮ Strategic investment evaluation ⋮ Hiding and herding in market entry ⋮ Learning from private and public observations of others' actions ⋮ Strategic investment with positive externalities ⋮ Strategic experimentation with private payoffs ⋮ Strategic investment under uncertainty: a synthesis ⋮ Super- and submodularity of stopping games with random observations ⋮ Optimal dividend policy and growth option ⋮ Investment timing and capacity decisions with time-to-build in a duopoly market ⋮ Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs ⋮ Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse ⋮ Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game ⋮ Inefficiency of sponsored research ⋮ Optimal stopping problems in Lévy models with random observations ⋮ Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management ⋮ Strategic investment under incomplete information ⋮ Alertness, leadership, and nascent market dynamics
Cites Work
- Real options and preemption under incomplete information
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty
- Sectoral Shocks, Learning, and Aggregate Fluctuations
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Strategic Experimentation
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
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