Stochastic stability in a double auction
From MaRDI portal
Publication:705852
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.010zbMath1091.91027OpenAlexW3122782713MaRDI QIDQ705852
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.010
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