Stochastic stability in a double auction

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.010zbMath1091.91027OpenAlexW3122782713MaRDI QIDQ705852

Murali Agastya

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargaining solutionMultiple equilibriaRisk potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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