Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.005zbMath1117.90307OpenAlexW2165742345MaRDI QIDQ705856

Roland Hain, Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78388

zbMATH Keywords

Ex-post equilibriumFirst best implementabilitySimple sequencing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22)

Related Items (13)

A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency ⋮ Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ Relative priority policies for minimizing the cost of queueing systems with service discrimination ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules

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