Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009zbMath1085.91002OpenAlexW2144085792MaRDI QIDQ705861

Arthur J. Robson, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (9)

On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games ⋮ Feigning ignorance for long-term gains ⋮ Presenting an algorithm to find Nash equilibrium in two-person static games with many strategies ⋮ A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem. ⋮ Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views ⋮ Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty ⋮ Leadership games with convex strategy sets ⋮ On the Commitment Value and Commitment Optimal Strategies in Bimatrix Games ⋮ Two-period dynamic versus fixed-ratio pricing in a capacity constrained duopoly

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