On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003zbMath1085.91003OpenAlexW2084216222MaRDI QIDQ705862

Makoto Shimoji

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

Conditional dominanceForward inductionNormal form information setRationalizabilitySequential best responseWeak dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (6)

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

Cites Work

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• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance

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