A model of the origins of basic property rights

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.008zbMath1085.91014OpenAlexW2148759081MaRDI QIDQ705870

Abhinay Muthoo

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8848/1/dp546.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Incentive-compatible agreementsInter-player transfers of outputNatural equilibriumProperty rightsSelf-enforcementState-of-nature

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50)

Related Items (4)

Markets and jungles ⋮ On the social efficiency of conflict ⋮ Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports ⋮ Spatial pillage game

Cites Work

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• Commitment and observability in games
• Conflict and distribution
• Bargaining in a non-stationary environment.

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