The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.07.003zbMath1085.91005OpenAlexW3123969062MaRDI QIDQ705875

Felix Várdy

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

First-mover advantageLeader-follower gameObservation costStackelberg duopolyValue of commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (11)

STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Noisy leadership: An experimental approach ⋮ Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ Effects of strategic choices for the postmerger manufacturer on supply chain members ⋮ Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition ⋮ Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion ⋮ The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly ⋮ Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage ⋮ An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs ⋮ Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Commitment and observability in games
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

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