An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.005zbMath1121.91007OpenAlexW3125366649MaRDI QIDQ705876

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

ExperimentsCommitmentCostly leader gamesObservation costsStackelberg duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Noisy leadership: An experimental approach ⋮ Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly ⋮ From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

Cites Work

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Commitment and observability in games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

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