Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001zbMath1117.91331OpenAlexW2075978249MaRDI QIDQ705896

Pablo Revilla, José Alcalde

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

StabilityCoalition formationResearch teams configurationsStrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (21)

COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY ⋮ On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games ⋮ Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation and stability ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ On top responsiveness and strict core stability ⋮ Hedonic expertise games ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games ⋮ Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games ⋮ Rationing rules and stable coalition structures ⋮ The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games ⋮ Strategy-proof coalition formation ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Coalition formation and stability
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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