An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2002.02.001zbMath1085.91022OpenAlexW2026469230MaRDI QIDQ705945

Benny Moldovanu, Oliver Kirchkamp

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2833/1/dp00_10.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ On efficiency of the English auction ⋮ Asymmetric English auctions. ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment

Uses Software

• Stata
• hreg

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables
• Tobit models: A survey
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Auctions
• Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable Is Truncated Normal
• An Efficient Auction
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

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