The coalition structure core is accessible
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Publication:705946
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.006zbMath1085.91008OpenAlexW2126101086MaRDI QIDQ705946
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/802612/guid-79a81e0e-ddaf-4909-b692-bd8e3fc49255-ASSET1.0.pdf
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