Bargaining with an agenda
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Publication:705954
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002zbMath1085.91024OpenAlexW3023681837MaRDI QIDQ705954
Barry O'Neill, Dov Samet, Eyal Winter, Zvi Wiener
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002
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