Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2003.09.028zbMath1132.91332OpenAlexW1972266438MaRDI QIDQ707118

Lyn C. Thomas, Miguel A. Hinojosa, Amparo M. Mármol

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.09.028

zbMATH Keywords

Game theoryCooperative gamesLexicographical solutionsMultiple scenario

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information ⋮ A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references ⋮ A preemptive goal programming for multi‐objective cooperative games: an application to multi‐objective linear production ⋮ On the set of imputations induced by the \(k\)-additive core ⋮ Managerial insights from service industry models: a new scenario decomposition method ⋮ Collaborating freight forwarding enterprises

Uses Software

• ADBASE

Cites Work

• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Set-valued TU-games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Fuzzy and multiobjective games for conflict resolution
• Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes
• Core solutions in vector-valued games
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