Informal communication
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Publication:707291
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004zbMath1181.91042OpenAlexW4243738808MaRDI QIDQ707291
Publication date: 9 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.004
Related Items (13)
Screening and Signaling in Communication* ⋮ Credulity, lies, and costly talk ⋮ Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Value of public information in sender-receiver games ⋮ Pathways of persuasion ⋮ A must lie situation -- avoiding giving negative feedback ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Professional advice ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
Cites Work
- Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
- Communication between rational agents
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Credible proposals in communication games
- Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
- A Theory of Credibility
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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