Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness

DOI10.1007/s10058-009-0082-yzbMath1233.91169OpenAlexW1977458337MaRDI QIDQ707701

Takashi Kunimoto

Publication date: 8 October 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1987

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsasymmetric informationindividual rationalityincentive compatibilityirrelevance theoremBayesian implementationindescribability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage

Cites Work

• Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms