The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games
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Publication:708322
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2010.02.007zbMath1231.91088OpenAlexW2043734032MaRDI QIDQ708322
N. Jiménez, J. J. López, Jésus Mario Bilbao, Julio R. Fernández
Publication date: 11 October 2010
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.02.007
Related Items (4)
Multi- and multi-polar capacities ⋮ Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games ⋮ Bisemivalues for bicooperative games ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
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