Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games?
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Publication:708640
DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2010.05.002zbMath1232.91110OpenAlexW2134890343MaRDI QIDQ708640
Publication date: 14 October 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59524
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