A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9159-xzbMath1232.91197OpenAlexW2063262321MaRDI QIDQ708800

İpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 14 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9159-x

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitytournamentsNash implementationCondorcet consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

Cites Work

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