Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0455-8zbMath1232.91530OpenAlexW3125517159MaRDI QIDQ708883

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/49172

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (20)

Median stable matchings in two-sided markets ⋮ A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility ⋮ Finding a Level Ideal of a Poset ⋮ Stochastic stability for roommate markets ⋮ Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems ⋮ The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs ⋮ Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets ⋮ Lone wolves in competitive equilibria ⋮ What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets ⋮ When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review ⋮ Median stable matching for markets with wages ⋮ Impossibilities for roommate problems ⋮ The roommate problem with externalities ⋮ A bargaining set for roommate problems ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings ⋮ Quantile stable mechanisms

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