Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0462-9zbMath1232.91173OpenAlexW3122475565MaRDI QIDQ708887

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Georges Casamatta

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3442/1/medias/doc/by/de_donder/repeated.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Voting over income taxation
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

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