Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2zbMath1232.91529OpenAlexW3124023383MaRDI QIDQ708931

Claus-Jochen Haake, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/d8ee9984-ddaa-4b00-9dec-5318e786deb2

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityNash implementation(Maskin) monotonicitymatching with couplesweakly responsive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching

Cites Work

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