Combining strength and uncertainty for preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution with multiple decision makers

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9134-6zbMath1232.91146OpenAlexW2054476895MaRDI QIDQ708934

Ye Chen, D. Marc Kilgour, Hai-Yan Xu, Keith William Hipel

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9134-6

zbMATH Keywords

decision analysisstrength of preferencegraph model for conflict resolutionhybrid preferencespreference uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Related Items (11)

Initial state stability forn-decision-maker conflicts ⋮ Theory and application of conflict resolution with hybrid preference in colored graphs ⋮ Matrix representation of stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution with grey-based preferences ⋮ A time sensitive graph model for conflict resolution with application to international air carbon negotiation ⋮ Matrix representation of consensus and dissent stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution ⋮ Mixed stabilities for analyzing opponents' heterogeneous behavior within the graph model for conflict resolution ⋮ Inverse engineering preferences in simple games ⋮ Theory and implementation of coalitional analysis in cooperative decision making ⋮ Matrix representation of stability definitions for the graph model for conflict resolution with reciprocal preference relations ⋮ Fuzzy levels of preference strength in a graph model with multiple decision makers ⋮ The graph model for composite decision makers and its application to a water resource conflict

Cites Work

• Equilibria for far-sighted players
• Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts
• Non-cooperative games
• Axiomatic Foundation of the Analytic Hierarchy Process
• Theory of Moves
• Status quo analysis in the graph model for conflict resolution
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
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