A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9150-6zbMath1232.91176OpenAlexW1977833898MaRDI QIDQ708939

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9150-6

zbMATH Keywords

influence functionkernelfollower of a coalitionperfect followerweighted negative influence indexweighted positive influence index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements ⋮ A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations ⋮ NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ Social norms in networks ⋮ Lattices in Social Networks with Influence ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games

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