Pure strategy equilibria in Bertrand games with discontinuous demand and asymmetric tie-breaking rules

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.016zbMath1196.91011OpenAlexW2072853799MaRDI QIDQ709075

Adib Bagh

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.016

zbMATH Keywords

tie-breaking rulesBertrand gamesstrictly convex costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (5)

Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization ⋮ A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints ⋮ Ambiguity and price competition ⋮ Price competition or price leadership

Cites Work

• Bertrand games and sharing rules
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches
• Winner-take-all price competition

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