Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.019zbMath1196.91024OpenAlexW1994479418MaRDI QIDQ709076

Ville Korpela

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.019

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementation\(n \geq 2\) players(Maskin) monotonicityMoore-Repullo-setno veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

Cites Work

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

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