Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.06.005zbMath1231.91024OpenAlexW2023843059MaRDI QIDQ709089

Rui Li

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

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