Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
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Publication:709095
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.023zbMath1196.91015OpenAlexW2042234459MaRDI QIDQ709095
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.023
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Cites Work
- The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions
- On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
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