Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.023zbMath1196.91015OpenAlexW2042234459MaRDI QIDQ709095

Shinichiro Takizawa

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.023

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesirreversibilityprivate informationdecisions under uncertaintytrigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

The Navier-Stokes equations under a unilateral boundary condition of Signorini's type ⋮ Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information

Cites Work

• The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Evaluating Environmental Investments: A Real Options Approach
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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