Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
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Publication:712479
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.04.004zbMath1250.91044OpenAlexW1965822118MaRDI QIDQ712479
Maik T. Schneider, Hans Gersbach
Publication date: 16 October 2012
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/43364/1/Gersbach_Schneider_MSS12_Tax_contracts_Government_Formation.pdf
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)
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Cites Work
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- Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
- Do voters vote ideologically?
- Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
- The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
- Electoral Systems and Public Spending
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