Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.018zbMath1259.91033OpenAlexW2017843071MaRDI QIDQ714788

Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman

Publication date: 11 October 2012

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.018

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymechanism designhidden action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (1)

The Complexity of Contracts

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Combinatorial agency
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem
• Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions
• Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Algorithmic Game Theory

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