Double-dipping in environmental markets

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2010.07.004zbMath1210.91097OpenAlexW2092236161MaRDI QIDQ716267

Richard T. Woodward

Publication date: 27 April 2011

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26185/1/MPRA_paper_26185.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

numerical methodsenvironmental policystackingtradable discharge permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Interactive pollutants and joint abatement costs: achieving water quality standards with effluent charges
• An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
• Transaction costs and tradeable permits

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