Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions

DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9196-5zbMath1232.91308OpenAlexW2025385816MaRDI QIDQ719055

Dinard van der Laan, Harold Houba, Dirk Veldhuizen

Publication date: 27 September 2011

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9196-5

zbMATH Keywords

maximinevolutionary stabilityendogenous entrysealed-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

An experiment on lowest unique integer games ⋮ Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions ⋮ Price reveal auctions ⋮ Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games ⋮ The Simplest Unlimited-Player Game of Skill ⋮ Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics ⋮ Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions ⋮ Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty

Uses Software

• GAMS
• Gambit

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Large Poisson games
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On the existence of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Additively decomposed quasiconvex functions

This page was built for publication: Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions