Strategic behavior under partial cooperation
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Publication:719057
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9246-7zbMath1232.91017OpenAlexW2030345994MaRDI QIDQ719057
Emiliya A. Lazarova, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P. Gilles
Publication date: 27 September 2011
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9246-7
Related Items (3)
Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations ⋮ Partially cooperative games ⋮ Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
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