Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
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Publication:719874
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.009zbMath1236.91073OpenAlexW3125840495MaRDI QIDQ719874
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/4100
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
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