Network architecture, salience and coordination

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001zbMath1236.91044OpenAlexW2109710633MaRDI QIDQ719877

D. Kharzeev

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-165659587

zbMATH Keywords

experimentnetworkscoordinationmonotone gamesstrategic commitmentstrategic delay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Dynamic games (91A25) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence
• Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Dynamic coordination games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment

This page was built for publication: Network architecture, salience and coordination