English auctions with resale: an experimental study
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Publication:719883
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.005zbMath1236.91047OpenAlexW2153992396MaRDI QIDQ719883
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/3893/1/English%20Auctions%20with%20Resale.pdf
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach ⋮ Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation ⋮ Speculation in procurement auctions ⋮ On the persistence of strategic sophistication ⋮ Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ English auctions with resale: an experimental study ⋮ Auctions with speculators: an experimental study ⋮ Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment
Uses Software
Cites Work
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