On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
From MaRDI portal
Publication:719899
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.12.009zbMath1236.91027OpenAlexW2070596625MaRDI QIDQ719899
Yves Guéron, Thibaut Lamadon, Caroline D. Thomas
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.009
Related Items (5)
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring ⋮ Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ Time-preference heterogeneity and multiplicity of equilibria in two-group bargaining ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ Myopic perception in repeated games
Cites Work
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
- The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
- The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
- Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
This page was built for publication: On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
